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An Independent Journal on Statecraft, Technology, and Macro Policy.

Tarun Goyal New Delhi


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The Constitution of India, adopted in 1950, crafts a delicate balance of power among sovereign constitutional bodies such as Parliament, the President, the Supreme Court, and autonomous institutions like the Election Commission of India (ECI) and Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). Each is entrusted with specific duties under constitutional provisions to ensure democratic governance operates smoothly within the rule of law.

However, recent judicial conduct in 2025 exposes an alarming trend where the Supreme Court, entrusted with constitutional guardianship, increasingly acts beyond its mandate, effectively assuming the role of a “third chamber” alongside Parliament and the Executive. This essay critically examines the constitutional basis of these powers, instances of judicial overreach in 2025, and their implications on India’s democracy.


Constitutional Roles and Boundaries of Key Authorities

  • Parliament (Articles 79-122): Solely empowered to legislate on matters in the Union and Concurrent Lists and enact laws through democratic debates and processes.
  • President (Articles 52-78): Constitutional Head of State with specific roles in assenting to laws, appointing key officials, exercising discretionary powers sparingly.
  • Supreme Court (Articles 124-147): Guardian and interpreter of the Constitution with authority for judicial review to uphold constitutional supremacy but no power to legislate or execute policy.
  • Election Commission (Article 324): Independent constitutional body to manage free and fair elections with exclusive discretion on electoral processes including voter identification.
  • Union Public Service Commission (Articles 315-323): Manages recruitment and service conditions for civil services with autonomous constitutional safeguards.

This architecture ensures separation of powers fundamental to democracy, wherein the judiciary checks legality and constitutionality but does not substitute policy or legislative roles.


Judicial Overreach: Evident Patterns of 2025

  1. Mandating Policy Decisions: CTET as Mandatory Teacher Qualification
    The Supreme Court directed the Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) as mandatory for teaching jobs, a matter squarely within the executive and parliamentary domain. This judicial diktat substitutes elected government policy with court-imposed conditions, violating the principle that policy-making is not a judicial function.
  2. Waqf (Amendment) Act Interference
    In 2025, the Court suspended certain provisions of the Waqf Amendment Act despite no substantial constitutional invalidity raised against the entire law, disrupting the legislative will and veering into political and communal controversies. This selective interference smacks of judicial overreach into parliamentary legislation and social policy.
  3. Use of Article 142 to Grant Deemed Assent to Bills
    The apex court’s use of Article 142, which permits it to “do complete justice,” was controversially wielded to deem assent for Tamil Nadu bills stalled by the Governor’s delay. This effectively legislated from the bench, brazing through executive discretion and federal balance, drawing sharp criticism including from the Vice President as a “nuclear missile against democracy”.
  4. Binding Timeline for Presidential Assent
    By setting a three-month binding deadline for the President to decide on state bills, the Supreme Court imposed constraints on a constitutional discretion whose timing is deliberately left undefined by the Constitution to preserve executive flexibility and political prudence. This judicial imposition risks upsetting the federal compact and treating the President’s constitutional powers as judicially micromanaged rather than sovereign.
  5. Directive to Election Commission on Aadhaar for Voter ID
    The Court directed the Election Commission to include Aadhaar cards as valid voter identification, encroaching on ECI’s constitutionally exclusive domain under Article 324 to regulate election procedure. This leads to erosion of institutional autonomy and judicial interference in an independent constitutional body’s discretionary functions.
  6. Judicial Review of Legislative Punishments
    In the case of the expulsion of a member from the Bihar Legislative Council, the Supreme Court not only reviewed but struck down the expulsion as excessive punishment. While judicial review is necessary to protect rights, extensive scrutiny of internal legislature disciplinary actions potentially threatens legislative privileges and independence.

Constitutional Provisions on Separation of Powers and Institutional Autonomy

  • Article 50 mandates separation of judiciary and executive.
  • Article 212(1) bars courts from inquiring into proceedings of Parliament.
  • Article 200 and 201 empower Governor and President respectively to assent or withhold assent to bills, with discretionary timelines.
  • Article 324 vests exclusive and autonomous powers in the Election Commission over election matters.
  • Article 142 provides wide but exceptional powers to the Supreme Court for delivering complete justice in pending cases, not for routine governance or legislation.
  • The Preamble and the basic structure doctrine uphold the democratic principle and federal system guardianship.

“Third Chamber of Parliament”

When unelected judges regularly legislate quasi-policy directives, interfere in parliamentary laws without clear constitutional grounds, and instruct independent constitutional bodies on their core functions, the judiciary undermines democratic accountability. This transmutation of the Supreme Court into a “third chamber” usurps the very roles constitutionally and democratically assigned to Parliament and executive.

Such judicial overreach:

  • Disrupts the separation of powers
  • Diminishes Parliament’s sovereignty as the law-making institution
  • Weakens executive discretion necessary for governance
  • Erodes autonomy of independent constitutional bodies like ECI
  • Undermines political accountability to the electorate
  • Sets alarming precedents normalizing judicial intervention into routine governance

The use of Article 142 as a legislative shortcut especially reflects an expansive judicial mindset that prioritizes immediate justice as defined by judges over constitutional fidelity and democratic process.


The Way Forward: Need for Judicial Restraint

The Supreme Court’s core constitutional duty is to protect the Constitution, fundamental rights, and prevent unconstitutional excesses—not to substitute judiciary’s will for democratic choices. Judicial activism has its place in checking executive excess, but must not transmute into judicial despotism or policy-making authority.

Judicial restraint respecting the role and autonomy of Parliament, the President, and constitutional bodies like ECI is vital to:

  • Preserve democratic governance and accountability
  • Maintain institutional trust and federal harmony
  • Protect the basic structure and separation of powers
  • Ensure the judiciary remains a neutral, impartial constitutional guardian

India’s democracy thrives when each constitutional authority functions within its defined sphere, not when judges become legislators or policy-makers. A recalibration of the Supreme Court’s role in 2025 and beyond is urgently needed to restore constitutional sanity and full respect for democratic processes.


Conclusion

The year 2025 has laid bare the consequences of Supreme Court activism evolving into overreach, transforming it into a de facto third chamber of Parliament. This poses a grave challenge to India’s constitutional architecture, democratic ethos, and institutional autonomy. The judiciary must reclaim its role as a vigilant but restrained guardian of the Constitution, strictly adjudicating on constitutional matters and refraining from substituting its own judgment for that of elected institutions. Only by doing so can it preserve the constitutional balance vital to Indian democracy.


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